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Just as a house typically comes with a roof that keeps it safe
from the elements, a marriage typically comes with evidentiary
privileges that keep it safe from the storms of litigation. Sometimes,
however, a couple gets married, expecting the protection of those
privileges, but the marriage is less, legally, than the couple expected it
to be-like a house without a roof.
Same-sex couples, along with their allies, have fought to gain
legal recognition for their unions, and more and more jurisdictions are
recognizing that same-sex couples have the right to marry. Denying
same-sex spouses the marital privileges, which "promote family
harmony and ... encourage spouses 'to share their most closely
guarded secrets and thoughts, thus adding an additional measure of
intimacy and mutual support to the marriage,"" undermines the
matrimonial bonds that same-sex couples fought so hard to achieve.
The law of evidence has recognized two distinct marital privileges,
which are designed to protect marital unions. The first of these
privileges, the "anti-marital facts privilege," which is available only in
criminal cases in some jurisdictions, protects one spouse from being
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1. Ulibarri v. Sup. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Coconino, 909 P.2d 449, 454 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting MORRIS K. UDALL ET AL., LAW OF EviDENCE § 73 (3d ed. 1991)).
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compelled to testify against the other during the marriage. 2 The
second, the "confidential communications privilege," protects spouses
from having their confidential marital communications disclosed in
legal proceedings. 3 All jurisdictions in the United States recognize one
or both of these privileges.4
2. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 501.02[8] (9th ed. 2006).
3. Id.
4. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-53 (1980); ALA. R. EVID. 504
(confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings); ALA. CODE §
12-21-227 (2009) (anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings); ALASKA R. EvID. 505
(confidential communications and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal
proceedings); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2231 to 2232 (2010) (confidential
communications and anti-marital fact privileges in civil proceedings); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4062 (2010) (confidential communications and anti-marital fact privileges in criminal
proceedings); ARK. R. EvID. 504 (confidential communications privilege limited to criminal
proceedings); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 970-73, 980-87 (West 2010) (confidential communications
and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings); CoLo. REV. STAT. §
13-90-107(l)(a) (2010) (confidential communications and anti-marital facts privileges in both
civil and criminal proceedings); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-84a (West 2011) (anti-marital
facts privilege limited to criminal proceedings); State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1173
(Conn. 2004) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings);
DEL. R. EVID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings); D.C. CODE § 14-306 (2011) (confidential communications and anti-marital facts
privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings for spouses and domestic partners); FLA.
STAT. § 90.504 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-21, -23 (2010) (confidential communications privilege
in both civil and criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege limited to criminal
proceedings); HAW. R. EvID. 505 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and
criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege limited to criminal proceedings); IDAHO R.
EVID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-801 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in civil cases); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-16 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in criminal cases);
IND. CODE § 34-46-3-1(4) (2010) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and
criminal proceedings); IOWA CODE § 622.9 (2009) (confidential communications privilege in
both civil and criminal proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-423(b) (2011) (confidential
communications privilege in criminal proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428 (2011)
(confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings, but only
applicable during the life of the marriage); Ky. R. EVID. 504 (confidential communications and
anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts.
504-05 (2009) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings;
anti-marital facts privilege in criminal, commitment, or interdiction proceedings); ME. R.
EVID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105-06 (West 2010) (confidential communications
privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege in criminal
proceedings); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 20 (2009) (confidential communications privilege
in both civil and criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162 (2010) (confidential communications and anti-marital facts
privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2010) (confidential
communications and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings);
Miss. R. EvID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (2010) (anti-marital facts privilege in both civil and
226 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 11:2
One must be married, of course, to avail oneself of these
evidentiary privileges. Therefore, the privileges were not available to
same-sex couples in the United States until 2004, when Massachusetts
first legalized same-sex marriage.5 Now, six states and the District of
6Columbia recognize and grant same-sex marriages. Additionally, the
criminal proceedings); Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.260 (2009) (confidential communications and
anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (2009)
(confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-505 (2009) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege limited to criminal proceedings); NEv. REV. STAT. §
49,295 (2010) (confidential communications and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and
criminal proceedings); N.H.R. EVID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil
and criminal proceedings); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-17, 22 (2009) (confidential
communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege
limited to criminal proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (2009) (confidential
communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502
(CONsoL. 2007) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings; limited anti-marital facts privilege in issues founded on adultery); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 8-56-57 (2009) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings); N.D. R. EVID. 504
(confidential communications privilege limited to criminal proceedings); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2317.02, 2945.42 (West 2010) (confidential communications privilege in both civil
and criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 2504 (2010) (confidential communications privilege limited to criminal proceedings);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (2009) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and
criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege limited to criminal proceedings); 42 PA.
CONs. STAT. §§ 5913, 5915, 5923-24 (2010) (confidential communications and anti-marital
facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-13 (2010)
(confidential communications privilege and limited anti-marital facts privileges in civil
proceedings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in
both civil and criminal proceedings); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-12-19-13-15 (2010)
(confidential communications privilege limited to criminal proceedings); TENN. CODE ANN.
§24-1-201 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings); TEX. R. EVID. 504 (confidential communications privilege in both civil and
criminal proceedings; anti-marital facts privilege in criminal proceedings); UTAH R. EvID. 502
(confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings; anti-marital
facts privilege in criminal proceedings); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (2009) (confidential
communications privilege in both civil and criminal proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
398, 19.2-271.2 (2010) (confidential communications privilege in both civil and criminal
cases); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (2011) (confidential communications and anti-
marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (2010)
(confidential communications and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal
proceedings); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 2011) (confidential communications privilege
in both civil and criminal proceedings); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 275 (Wyo. 1994)
(interpreting Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-104 (2010) to grant both confidential communications
and anti-marital facts privileges in both civil and criminal proceedings).
5. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430
(last updated July 14, 2011) ("Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples in May 2004.").
6. See infra Part II.B. California also granted same-sex marriages for a short period,
such that although same-sex couples cannot marry in California today, "approximately 18,000
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Maryland Attorney General recently issued an opinion stating that
Maryland should recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into
outside the state.7 Also, ten states that do not recognize same-sex
marriages have enacted statutory schemes that provide for unions that
are decidedly not marriages but are meant to be imbued with at least
some of the burdens and benefits of marriage, including one or both
marital privileges.8 Despite of the growing number of jurisdictions that
legally recognize same-sex unions, the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act-which remains in effect even though the Obama administration
recently announced that it will not defend the Act9-limits marriages
to man-woman unions and specifies that states need not recognize
same-sex unions or their incidental rights.' 0 In fact, more than thirty
states either give no legal recognition to same-sex relationships or
grant limited rights to same-sex couples that do not include the marital
evidentiary privileges. 1  This discord between varying jurisdictions
may leave attorneys, judges, and married couples without a clear
understanding of the rights and privileges possessed by same-sex
married couples who are involved in court proceedings. Availability of
same-gender couples were legally wed in California prior to the November 2008 passage of
California Proposition 8 and most of them may well remain validly married for all purposes
under California law." In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, n.2 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
7. Marriage-Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is Valid in the State of
Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 3, 3-4 (2010).
8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2010) (granting domestic partners the same rights as
spouses); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 §§ 201-217 (2011) (establishing civil unions and granting
members of civil unions the same rights as same-sex couples); S. 232, 26th Legis., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2011) (allowing for civil unions and giving participants the same rights as married
couples); Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 2010 Ill. Legis. Serv. 96-
1513 (West) (allowing civil unions between same-sex partners; granting participants the same
protections given to married couples; and recognizing same-sex marriages from other
jurisdictions as civil unions); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010-510 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
37:1-28-34 (West 2009) (providing for and recognizing civil unions; granting the marital
privilege to members of civil unions); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.310, 340 (2009) (providing for
domestic partnerships and giving domestic partners the same rights as married couples); An
Act Relating to Domestic Relations-Civil Unions, 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 198; WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.60.010-.901 (2009) (providing for domestic partnerships and giving partners the
same rights as married couples); Wis. STAT. § 770.05 (providing for domestic partnerships);
Wis. STAT. §905.05 (granting the confidential communications privilege to domestic partners).
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/ 1 -ag-222.html.
10. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). But see In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 574
n.5 (concluding that the Federal DOMA is unconstitutional and citing in support In re
Levenson (Levenson 1), 560 F.3d 1145, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 2009)); In re Levenson (Levenson
17), 587 F.3d 925, 931-33 (9th Cir. 2009); Dragovich v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 764
F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190-91 (N.D. Ca. 2011); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d
374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010)).
11. See infra Table 1.
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spousal privileges affects trial strategy' 2 and may affect the outcome of
a case.
This article will identify both the forums and circumstances in
which same-sex spouses may assert the evidentia 7 spousal privileges
and the impediments to making such assertions. To do so, it will
examine evidentiary privileges generally, the two spousal privileges,
and their purpose.14 It will then provide background information
regarding same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships.' 5 Next, it will look at federal and state Defense of
Marriage Acts and explore their impact on the availability of
- 16
evidentiary privileges to those joined in same-sex legal unions.
Applying a conflict of laws analysis and categorizing same-sex
marriages to determine their validity in a forum state, this article will
determine the availability of state marital privileges to couples in
same-sex marriages. 17 It will also determine the availability of the
marital evidentiary privileges in federal court and the availability of
those privileges to same-sex couples joined in other legal unions.
Finally, this article will provide equal protection arguments to
challenge the denial of evidentiary privileges to same-sex couples
joined in legal unions. 9
II. BACKGROUND
Parties and witnesses may assert evidentiary privileges under
certain circumstances, and two of these privileges are designed to
protect marriages. Because some jurisdictions recognize same-sex
marriages or similar unions, and others prohibit such unions, the scope
and availability of these marital privileges to same-sex couples is not
always clear.
12. See People v. Rockey, 601 N.W. 2d 887, 890 (1999) ("Decisions regarding what
evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of
trial strategy.").
13. See infra Parts III-V.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Parts IV and V.
19. See infra Part VI.
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A. Evidentiary Privileges, Including the Spousal Evidentiary
Privileges
Evidentiary privileges are used at trial to exclude certain
testimonial evidence. Thus, evidentiary privileges may suppress the
truth, even though trials are meant to be searches for the truth.20
"Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the
fundamental principle that 'the public ... has a right to every man's
evidence."' 21 Courts therefore construe evidentiary privileges narrowly
to ensure that the privileges do not exclude more evidence than
22 23
necessary. Indeed, the courts disfavor evidentiary privileges. For a
privilege to stand, it must "promote[] sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of ...
justice."24 Two distinct spousal evidentiary privileges are essential to
promote the important interest of preserving marriage. The anti-marital
facts privilege provides that courts cannot compel one spouse to testify
against the other spouse during their marriage. 25 The confidential
communications privilege protects confidential communications that
occurred during a marriage whether or not couple still is married.26
Although the availability and scope of the privileges vary by
jurisdiction, the policy reasons behind these evidentiary privileges are
largely the same across the United States. 27
Common law provides for both federal spousal privileges 28 and
shows that the two privileges share the similar purpose of protecting
20. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (explaining that ascertaining the
truth is normally the predominant goal of a trial); United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he cost of that [evidentiary] privilege is a reduction in truthful disclosure.").
21. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)).
22. Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144-45 (2003).
23. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (footnote omitted).
24. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
25. SALTZBURG, supra note 2; see infra notes 30 -37 and accompanying text.
26. SALTZBURG, supra note 2; see infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 36-37,41-47 and accompanying text.
28. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
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marriages.29 Under the federal "anti-marital facts privilege,"30 when
one spouse is the defendant in a criminal matter in federal court, the
other s ouse cannot be compelled to testify against the defendant
spouse. ' This federal privilege applies only when the defendant and
potentially adverse witness are married at the time of trial.32 Under
federal law, the testifying spouse holds the privilege and can choose to
waive it; the defendant spouse does not hold the privilege and
therefore cannot prevent the other spouse from testifying.
The anti-marital facts privilege originated as an extension of a
man's control over his chattel, including his wife. 34 It was not so much
the wife's privilege not to testify, but rather the husband's privilege
not to have his property used against him.35 As this conceptualization
of marriage changed, so did the privilege, such that it now preserves
the "important public interest in marital harmony," not proprietary
interests. 36 It also "protect[s] a witness from the difficult choice of
incriminating a spouse or going to jail for contempt." 37
Under the federal confidential communications privilege,
spouses who communicated to their marital partners in confidence can
prevent testimony about the communication in two ways: by refusing
The legislature rejected a codification of specific evidentiary privileges and adopted the more
general Rule 501 to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis,' and to leave the door open to change." Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
29. See infra notes 36-37, 41-43 and accompanying text.
30. See United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992) (referring to this
privilege as the "anti-marital facts privilege").
31. United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978). Exceptions exist, for
instance in a domestic violence case where the defendant's spouse is a victim witness,
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 n.7, but these exceptions fall outside the scope of this article.
32. SALTZBURG, supra note 2.
33. Id. (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)). For an in-depth
examination of the impact of Defense of Marriage Acts on a same-sex spouse trying to assert
this privilege, see Maria A. La Vita, Note, When the Honeymoon is Over: How a Federal
Court's Denial of the Spousal Privilege to a Legally Married Same-Sex Couple Can Result in
the Incarceration of a Spouse Who Refuses to Adversely Testify, 33 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 243 (2007).
34. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 ("The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege
have long since disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world-indeed in any modem
society-is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and
the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being. Chip by chip, over the years
those archaic notions have been cast aside . .
35. Id.
36. Id. at 53 ("Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so
that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be
neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.").
37. SALTZBURG, supra note 2.
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to testify, or by refusing to allow their spouses to testify. 38 The
privilege protects any confidential communications that happened
during marriage, and the couple need not be married at the time of trial
to assert the privilege.3 9 Either spouse may assert the privilege.40
Federal cases tout the confidential communications privilege as a safe
harbor for the marital relationship, 41 reiterating the United States
Supreme Court's long-standing characterization of the marital
relationship as "the best solace of human existence."4 2 This privilege
protects "marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the
disadvantages to the administration of justice [that] the privilege
entails."43
States offer similar policy reasons in support of their spousal
privileges, 44 which generally reflect the federal privileges. 45 All states
and the District of Columbia recognize the confidential
communications privilege, but twenty-one states do not recognize the
anti-marital facts privilege.46 Five states limit the application of
spousal privileges to criminal proceedings. 47 This article does not
focus on the nuances of the spousal privileges across jurisdictions.
Rather, it addresses when and where the marital privileges that
different-sex couples can invoke are available to same-sex couples
joined in marriages, civil unions, or partnerships.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 2002).
41. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); SEC v. Lavin, Ill F.3d
921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
42. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839). The Court also notes that domestic
relations "constitute the basis of civil society." Id.
43. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
44. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 380 A.2d 49, 51-52 (Md. 1977) (identifying the purpose
of the confidential communications privilege as "promoting marital harmony" and listing
policy reasons as follows: "(1) that the communications originate in confidence, (2) the
confidence is essential to the relation, (3) the relation is a proper object of encouragement by
the law, and (4) the injury that would inure to it by the disclosure is probably greater than the
benefit that would result in the judicial investigation of truth."); Johnson v. State, 848 A.2d
660, 667 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) ("The purpose of the [spousal adverse testimony]
privilege is to maintain and foster the marital relationship."); People v. Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d
68, 68-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) ("The public policy rationale for creation of the privilege was
the need to encourage marital confidences free from State intrusion. Moreover, the privilege
would foster the goals of the institution of marriage by enabling couples to communicate
deepest feelings to each other without fear of eventual exposure in court.").
45. See infra Table 1.
46. See infra Table 1.
47. See infra Table 1 (showing that Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota do not recognize either privilege in civil proceedings).
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B. Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships
In recent years, several jurisdictions have recognized same-sex
relationships as valid under the law. Courts in Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Vermont have recognized explicitly that denying the
benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples violates their
state constitutions. 48 Legislatures have done the same in Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Oregon. 49 For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held "that under the equal protection guarantee of Article I,
Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, committed same-sex
couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits
enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples." 0 Following that court
decision and "to comply with [its] constitutional mandate," the New
Jersey Legislature found that "[p]romoting such stable and durable
relationships as well as eliminating obstacles and hardships these
couples may face is necessary and proper and reaffirms this State's
obligation to insure equality for all the citizens of New Jersey."5'
To provide the benefits and burdens of marriage, including
spousal privileges, to same-sex couples, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Vermont have legalized same-sex marriages; 52 Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, and New Jersey have established civil unions; 53  and
California, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and
48. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (N.J.
2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999).
49. An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection Under the Constitution of
the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28
(West 2007); Oregon Family Fairness Act, 2007 Or. Laws 99. 2007.
50. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 220-21.
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West, 2007).
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. 46b-20a (2009); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2010); Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 906; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2009);
Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 95; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 §§ 201-217 (West 2011) (establishing civil unions and
granting members of civil unions the same rights as same-sex couples); S. 232, 26th Legis.,
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011) (allowing for civil unions and giving participants the same rights as
married couples); Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 2010 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 96-1513 (West 2011) (allowing civil unions between same-sex partners that grant
participants the same protections given to married couples and recognizing same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions as civil unions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West 2009)
(making civil unions available to same-sex couples as an equivalent to marriage with the same
rights, benefits and burdens).
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Wisconsin have created domestic partnerships.54 However, most states
do not recognize same-sex unions, which means that the availability of
the marital privileges across jurisdictions is unclear.
C The Passage and Effect of "Defense of Marriage" Acts
Not only do many states not recognize same-sex unions, many
jurisdictions, including the federal government, have gone so far as to
enact legislation to exclude same-sex couples from enjoying the legal
benefits of marriage. The federal government passed the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act5s (Federal DOMA) in 1996 to preserve
marriage as an institution reserved to opposite-sex couples in the face
of efforts to give same-sex couples the right to marry. 56 The Federal
DOMA narrowly defines the terms "spouse" and "marriage" in federal
legislation so that they exclude same-sex couples:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse"
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.57
The Federal DOMA also permits states not to recognize, or to
recognize only partially, the rights that other jurisdictions give to
same-sex couples who enter into marriages, civil unions, or domestic
partnerships:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States,
or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
54. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010-.510 (2009);
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.340 (2009); An Act Relating to Domestic Relations-Civil Unions, 2011
R.I. Pub. Laws 198; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010-.901 (2009); Wis. STAT. §§ 770.001,
770.05 (2010) (stating that domestic partnerships established in Wisconsin are "not
substantially similar to . . . marriage" and providing for domestic partnerships); Wis. STAT. §
905.05 (2010) (granting confidential communications privilege to domestic partners).
55. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at I U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
56. Id.
57. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.
Similarly, forty-one states have statutes or constitutional
amendments codifying their refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. 59
Twenty of these states go so far as to give no recognition to civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or other relationships that grant benefits
and burdens equal to those of marriage, even if they were legally
solemnized in another jurisdiction.60 Two of these states defined
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
59. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013
(2009); ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX § 1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, 112 (2010); ARK.
CONST. amend. 83; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (2010); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (held
unconstitutional in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay
denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, stay granted, 2010 WL 3212786, question certified, 628 F.3d
1191, certified question accepted); CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 101 (2010); FLA. CONST. art. I § 27; FLA. STAT. §§ 741.04,
.212 (2010); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2010); HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 23 (giving legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572-1 (2009) (reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples); IDAHO CONST. art. III, §28;
Idaho Code Ann. § 32-209 (2010); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212 (2005); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1
(2010); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101, 23-101-115 (2009); Ky.
CONST. § 233A; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, .020, .040, .045 (2009); LA. CONST. art.
XII, § 15; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 89, 96, 3520 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, §§ 650,
701 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2010); MIcH. CONST. art. 1, § 25;
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.1, .271, .272 (2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 517.01, .03, 518.01 (2010);
Miss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2010); Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 33;
Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2009); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-
103, 40-1-401 (2009); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
51-1-1.2 (2009); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-01, 14-03-08 (2009);
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (held unconstitutional by Phelps v. Johnson, No. DVO5 305642,
2005 WL 4651081 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty. Nov. 28, 2005)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3101.01 (West 2010); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2010); OR.
CONsT. art. XV, § Sa; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2010); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, 20-1-15 (2009); S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
25-1-1, 25-1-38 (2010); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2010);
TEX. CONst. art. 1, § 32; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (2009); UTAH CONST. art. 1, §
29; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1 (West 2010); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A; VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-45.2-45.3 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010, 26.04.020 (2009); W. VA.
CODE §§ 48-2-104, 48-2-603 (2009); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-
101 (2010).
60. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013; ARK. CONST. amend. 83;
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (2010); FLA. CONST. art. I § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO
CoNsT. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, §
15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2009); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29
(held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980,
984 (D. Neb. 2005)); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; S.C. CONST. art.
2011] SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 235
marriage as between a man and a woman before the passage of the
federal DOMA.6 1
Jurisdictions with DOMAs or equivalent laws do not recognize
same-sex marriages or their associated benefits and burdens. 62 In these
jurisdictions, the policy is to "protect the sanctity" of opposite-sex
marriages by deeming same-sex marriages, and sometimes even any
same-sex unions, legally void.63  Therefore, in jurisdictions with
DOMAs, same-sex spouses could have difficulty asserting evidentiary
privileges intended to help preserve marriages because courts could
conclude that allowing them to so invoke a marital privilege would
recognize and protect same-sex marriages.64
XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 29; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 15-A; W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603.
61. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2006); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101
(2005). New Hampshire also defined marriage as between a man and a woman before the
passage of the federal DOMA, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-2 (1992) (repealed 2009), but
New Hampshire now grants same-sex marriages. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 547:1-a (2009).
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1997) ("A
marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into by persons
of the same sex in another state of jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any
contractual rights created by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable.").
63. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03:
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a
woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in
encouraging, supporting, and protecting this unique relationship in order
to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its
children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is
invalid in this state.
(g) A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same sex in
the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be considered and
treated in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and
shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or other union
replicating marriage.
See also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
64. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139 cmt. b (1971)
("Most privileges are designed to encourage socially desirable confidences. Common
examples of such privileges involve communications between husband and wife . . . .");
People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (noting in dicta that, while the
legislature explicitly stated a public policy against same-sex marriages, it did not state any
public policy against common-law marriages, and therefore spousal privileges must extend to
common-law marriages validly contracted in other states).
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In re Marriage ofJLB. and H.B.,65 a Texas appellate case, is the
only reported decision to date that addresses the availability of spousal
privileges to same-sex couples in a state with a DOMA.66 The Texas
DOMA prohibits the creation or recognition of any same-sex union
that is similar to marriage. 67 In In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., a man
who entered into a same-sex marriage in Massachusetts filed for
divorce in a Texas court.68 He stated that he sought a divorce, rather
than a voidance of the marriage, because "benefits, like the spousal-
communication privilege and the community-property laws," would be
available to him in a divorce action, but would "not be available to him
if he pursue[d] a voidance action." 69 The State intervened, arguing that
the plaintiff was "not a party to a 'marriage' under Texas law, that he
[was] therefore not eligible for the remedy of divorce, and that the trial
court [could] not grant a divorce without violating Texas law."70 The
appellate court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the divorce petition, noting that Texas "may
constitutionally treat opposite-sex couples differently from all other
social units for purposes of marriage and divorce laws."71 It said that
the spouse's "arguments that he should be afforded rights such as the
spousal-communications privilege and community-property rights
must be addressed to the Texas Legislature." 72
Despite this outcome, same-sex spouses in other states with
DOMAs may be able to assert the marital privileges successfully.
Unlike Texas, some states do not proscribe marriage-like rights for
same-sex couples.73 For example, California, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin have state
DOMAs, but those states legally recognize same-sex unions.74 Eleven
65. 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010).
66. Id. See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of other cases
addressing the availability of marital privileges to same-sex couples.
67. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (West 2007) ("(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of
the union of one man and one woman. (b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may
not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.").
68. In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 659.
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id. at 659.
71. Id. at 679. Contra Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 155 (Wyo. 2011)
(holding that Wyoming trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over same-sex couple's
divorce action despite state DOMA).
72. Id
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76; see also infra Part V (possible assertions
in federal court despite federal DOMA).
74. See infra Table 1. Additionally, Maine and Maryland proscribe same-sex marriage
but offer limited domestic partnerships to same-sex couples. Id
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other states have DOMAs or similar laws that do not explicitly deny
recognition or rights to same-sex couples in civil unions or domestic
partnerships.
Of the ten jurisdictions without DOMAs or similar laws,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, New York,
Vermont, and the District of Columbia allow same-sex marriage;
Rhode Island and New Jersey recognize civil unions, and Rhode
Island's Attorney General stated that Rhode Island would recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage under principles of comity; and New
Mexico is silent on the issue.76 Given that U.S. jurisdictions do not
have a uniform approach to recognizing same-sex unions, predicting
whether a jurisdiction will allow couples joined in same-sex unions to
assert marital evidentiary privileges would seem to require oracular
faculties. Nonetheless, case law addressing the availability of marital
privileges to spouses from different-sex unions provides guidance.
III. AVAILABILITY OF STATE MARITAL PRIVILEGES TO COUPLES IN
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
It is not a novel issue for state courts to determine whether a
party or witness can assert a marital evidentiary privilege at trial. As
discussed in this part, courts have a method for analyzing this issue,
and this procedure helps evaluate the availability of the privileges to
couples in same-sex marriages.
Courts apply a two-tiered analysis to determine which marital
. . .77privileges, if any, a party or witness may assert in a trial. A trial court
must first determine whether a spouse could assert a marital
privilege.78 When two states with conflicting marital evidentiary
privilege laws have an interest in a state case, the court must address a
conflict of laws issue. Then, because only a spouse may assert the
privilege, the court determines whether the party or witness qualifies
as a spouse. 79 A conflict of laws problem also may arise at this phase if
the putative spouse married in another jurisdiction and the marriage is
75. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX § 1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, 25-112 (2010);
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 517.01, 517.03,
518.01 (2006); Miss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 33; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-
1 (2009); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (1996); TENN. CONST. art. XI,
§ 18; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (1977).
76. See infra Table 1; Katie Zezima, Rhode Island Steps Toward Recognizing Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.come/2007/02/22/us/22rhode.html.
77. See infra Part III.A-B.
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. See infra Part III.B. 1.
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not recognized in the state in which the case is heard. The court must
determine which laws govern the validity of the marriage and whether
the marriage is valid.80
A. Conflict ofLaws Regarding Privileges, Generally
Two states may have an interest in a state case and not have the
same evidentiary privileges, resulting in a conflict of laws regarding
privileges. To determine the availability to the privilege, the forum
state must consider the evidentiary rules of both states and the
relationship of the asserting party to the non-forum state or the forum
state's public policy.8'
For example, if Husband allegedly acted negligently in State A,
told Wife about the event in State B, and appeared as a defendant in a
negligence action in a State A court, both states have an interest in the
case. State A is interested in providing justice for wrongs done within
State A, and State B is interested in protecting the confidential
communications that happen within State B. If State B recognizes a
confidential communications privilege but State A has no confidential
communications privilege, then the court must determine whether
Husband may assert that privilege successfully in a State A court.
When two states are interested in a case but do not recognize
the same privilege, generally no privilege is recognized, and the
evidence is admissible. 82 Under this approach, evidence tends to be
admitted because one state's recognition of a privilege, even if that
state's substantive laws apply to the case, is not sufficient to exclude
the evidence. 83
In exceptional circumstances, a spouse will be able to assert the
privilege and exclude evidence even though only one state recognizes
a privilege. 84 The court first determines where the communication
transpired, typically by looking at which state "has the most significant
relationship with [the] communication" (the "significant relationship
state"). In the hypothetical negligence case where Husband was in
State B when he told Wife about his alleged negligence, State B was
the significant relationship state. If the significant relationship state
recognizes a privilege that the forum state does not and "there is some
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139 (1971).
83. Id. § 139 cmt. d.
84. Id
85. Id.
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special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be
given effect," then the forum state may apply the significant
relationship state's rule of privilege, allow the spouse to assert the
privilege, and exclude the evidence. 86
The court will weigh the following factors to see if a "special
reason" exists for excluding the evidence: "(1) the number and nature
of the contacts that the state of the forum has with the parties and with
the transaction involved, (2) the relative materiality of the evidence
that is sought to be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved and (4)
fairness to the parties."8 If Husband lived in State B and only traveled
to State A on the day that the alleged negligence occurred, there is
greater reason for allowing Husband to assert State B's confidential
communications privilege than there would be if Husband lived in
State A and visited State B briefly, during which time he told Wife
about his alleged negligence.
The other circumstance in which a court will allow a marital
privilege to be asserted in contravention with another jurisdiction's
privilege laws is when admitting the evidence would be "contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum."88 This exception could arise
when the forum recognizes the privilege, but the significant
relationship state does not recognize it.89 In the hypothetical above, if
State A recognized the privilege instead of State B, and State A had a
strong policy of protecting confidential communications to preserve
certain relationships, such as marriage, then Husband might be able to
assert the confidential communications privilege, even though State B
did not recognize it and was the significant relationship state.
B. Conflict ofLaws Regarding Marital Privileges for Couples in
Same-Sex Marriages
The analysis presented in the previous section is relatively
straightforward when courts are dealing with different-sex spouses.
But what happens when courts are met with same-sex spouses who
wish to assert marital evidentiary privileges? As noted, only spouses
can assert marital evidentiary privileges,9 and a same-sex couple may
have a valid marriage in one state but not in another state.91 Therefore,
86. Id. § 139(2).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(2) (1971).
88. Id. at § 139(1).
89. Id. at § 139(2).
90. See infra Part III.B. 1.
91. See supra Part II.B.
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courts must determine which state's laws govern the validity of the
marriage. 92 The burden of proving the validity of the marriage rests
with the person asserting the privilege, who must prove the existence
of marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. 93 Then the court must
determine whether the person has a valid marriage that justifies
assertion of the marital privilege. 94
1. Determining Availability Based on State Marriage Laws
Unlike privileges that are available under contracts other than
marriage, only spouses may assert marital evidentiary privileges, and a
party's home-state laws determine whether the party is a spouse. 95 A
forum state may recognize a marriage contracted in another
jurisdiction even if it could not have been contracted in the forum
state. 96 Conversely, the forum state's laws may proscribe such
recognition. 97 Andrew Koppelman, Professor of Law and Political
Science at Northwestern University, postulates that even when states
do not recognize same-sex marriage, they may recognize some of the
benefits traditionally associated with marriage based on the potential
availability of the privilege by contract apart from marriage. Under
this theory, if a same-sex spouse could assert a privilege by virtue of a
contract, "such as [one] pertaining to inheritance or to making medical
decisions for one's partner," then the court would recognize the
privilege because the right would not violate the forum state's public
policy regarding marriage.99 Conversely, privileges that are only
"conferred by operation of law, such as the right to file a joint tax
return or the right to a homestead exemption," would violate, or at
least threaten, public policy.'00
Marital evidentiary privileges fall into the latter category
because a marriage license is the only contract that can grant a marital
92. See infra text accompanying notes 104-106.
93. United States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (neither privilege
available to defendant who failed to prove valid marriage), aff'd without op., 568 F.2d 771 (3d
Cir. 1978); People v. Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) ("Inasmuch as the
defendant is seeking to establish the existence of a valid common law marriage, he has the
burden of proving that the marriage existed.").
94. See infra text accompanying notes 104-125; see also infra Part III.B.2.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 107-18.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 119-25.
98. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143 (2005).
99. Id at 2158.
100. Id
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evidentiary privilege.' 0' This classification is reasonable because the
very purpose of these privileges is to preserve marriages.102 Therefore,
spouses in same-sex marriages must prove the validity of their
marriages before asserting marital evidentiary privileges.' 03
Federal and state courts agree that the law of the couple's state
of domicile governs the validity of the marriage.' 0 4 Thus, courts
determine whether a party or witness qualifies as a spouse under the
law of that person's home state, even when the party or witness seeks
to assert a privilege under the laws of a different jurisdiction.105 A
party's or witness's own belief in the validity of the marriage is
inconsequential. 106
For various reasons, such as resolving family law or
inheritance disputes, states often will recognize a marriage that is valid
in the party's home-state even if the laws of the state whose
substantive laws apply to the case would not recognize such a union.107
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals explained:
As insistent as Maryland continues to be, however,
about the solemnizing prerequisite of a marriage
ceremony or celebration within the State, it nonetheless
looks, largely in the interest of interstate comity, with
benign indulgence on common law marriages when
they are entered into and recognized beyond our
borders . . . . "We accept the general rule that a
101. SALTZBURG, supra note 2.
102. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
103. See infra note 105.
104. United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The status of
marriage had been left to the states"). This article does not explore foreign marriages.
105. United States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
106. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. at 125 (citing United States v. Lewis, 363 F. Supp. 614, 619
(W.D. Pa. 1973)).
107. See, e.g., John Crane, Inc. v. Puller, 899 A.2d 879, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)
(reviewing Maryland's history of recognizing valid out-of-state marriages that would not have
been valid if entered into in Maryland); In re Toth Estate, 212 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1973) (recognizing marriage between first cousins because it was valid in Hungary,
where it was contracted). Compare People v. Vespucci, 745 N.Y.S.2d 391, 398 (N.Y. Co. Ct.
2002) (no spousal privilege for New York defendant with New York common-law marriage
because New York does not recognize common-law marriages) with People v. Suarez, 560
N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (spousal privilege for New York defendant with Ohio
common-law marriage).
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marriage valid where contracted or solemnized is valid
everywhere."108
Few state courts have considered the validity of a marriage
contracted in another state as it pertains to evidentiary marital
privileges. 109 In Maryland, where the state constitution defines
marriage as between a man and a woman but the Maryland Attorney
General has said that same-sex marriages should be recognized as
valid within the state, a Washington County trial court ruled that a
woman could invoke the right not to testify against her same-sex
spouse even though Maryland does not allow same-sex couples to
marry. 110 The couple had married in D.C., and the Maryland judge
concluded that the principle of reciprocity between the states, also
known as comity, demanded that the court recognize the validity of the
marriage. " Therefore, the spousal privilege extended to the same-sex
spouses.112
Using similar reasoning, the Michigan Court of Appeals in
People v. Schmidt affirmed a trial court's decision to allow a defendant
to assert the marital communications privilege when the defendant was
married to the witness under Alabama common law at the time of the
communication, even though Michigan had forbidden common-law
marriages for over forty years." 3 The court held that "Michigan
follows the general rule that 'a marriage valid where it is contracted is
valid everywhere.' Accordingly, this state will recognize the validity
of a common-law marriage contracted in another state that would be
valid by the laws of that state." 1 4
108. Puller, 899 A.2d at 912 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md.
1952) (considering adultery and illegitimacy)).
109. E.g., People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431 (Ct. App. Mich. 1998); People v.
Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d 68, 68-70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Don Aines, Judge: Woman Doesn 't
Have to Testify Against Same-Sex Spouse, HERALD-MAIL.COM (June 23, 2011),
http://www.herald-mail.com/news/local/hm-judge-rules-that-samesex-spouse-can-invoke-
spousal-privilege-20110623,0,3777097.story; cf Greenwald v. H & P 29th St. Assocs., 659
N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (not considering marriage but limiting Suarez
holding such that "spousal privilege of CPLR 4502(b), which, by its terms, protects
confidential communications between a 'husband' and 'wife' 'during marriage', does not
extend, in plaintiffs' words, 'to homosexuals in a spousal relationship"'); In re Marriage of
J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. Ct. 2010) (stating that Texas "may constitutionally
treat opposite-sex couples differently from all other social units for purposes of marriage and
divorce laws").
I 10. Aines, supra note 109.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d at 434.
114. Id. (quoting In re Toth Estate, 212 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)).
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In the New York Superior Court, as in Schmidt, the defendant
in People v. Suarez alleged a common-law marriage contracted outside
New York when New York forbade common-law marriages." 5 Suarez
and the witness lived together in New York, but the couple had spent
two to three weeks in Ohio, a state recognizing common-law
marriages, and allegedly reaffirmed their vows during that time.116 The
New York court, like the Michigan court in Schmidt, was willing to
recognize the marriage if the trial court found that the marriage was
valid where contracted.1 7 The appellate court remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing to determine if the defendant had a valid Ohio
common-law marriage." 8
The law of the forum, however, may render an otherwise valid
marriage invalid if recognizing the marriage strongly contravenes the
forum state's public policy.1 9 Under the Federal DOMA, a state court
need not recognize a same-sex marriage, despite its validity where
contracted.120 Many state DOMAs reiterate this power in their own
DOMAs or through their state constitutions.121 The effect of this can
be seen in Schmidt, in which the Michigan court recognized an out-of-
state common-law marriage that was forbidden by common law, but
115. People v. Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d 68, 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
116. Id. at 68.
117. Id. at 69-70.
118. Id. at 71; cf United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
privilege not available due to lack of valid marriage when defendant and witness cohabitated
for twenty-five years without marrying in state not recognizing common-law marriage).
119. Contrary to popular belief, Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, which
requires that states give full faith and credit to "the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State," does not require states to recognize marriages contracted in
other states. Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166, 187 (2005). ("The Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law where it violates its
own legitimate public policy.") The topic is beyond the scope of this article but addressed
exhaustively in Koppelman, supra note 98. Comity is another misconstrued concept. "Comity
refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of
cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states." Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987). Like the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the rule of comity does not require states to recognize marriages
in other states. Sam v. Sam, 134 P.3d 761, 766 (N.M. 2006). ("In deciding whether to
recognize [a foreign] marriage that undoubtably [sic] went against the public policy of [the
forum state] to some degree, 'the dispositive question is whether the marriage offends a
sufficiently strong public policy to outweigh the purposes served by the rule of comity.")
(quoting Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1055 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
121. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1997) ("A marriage between persons of the same
sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or
jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such
marriage shall be void and unenforceable.").
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not by statute.122 The court suggested in dicta that it would not
recognize a same-sex marriage because the legislature explicitly
refused to recognize same-sex marriages.123 Many state DOMAs
specify that the state does not recognize the privileges associated with
a marriage that the state deems void.124 Thus, courts in jurisdictions
that have state DOMAS are likely to find same-sex marriages
invalid. 125
2. Categorizing Same-Sex Marriages to Determine Validity
Commentators have hypothesized that the recognition of same-
sex marriages may depend on which of four categories the marriages
fall into: 126 "evasive," "migratory," "extraterritorial," or "visitor."127
The category of a same-sex marriage therefore suggests whether a
same-sex spouse could assert a marital privilege successfully.
"Evasive marriages," that is, those "in which parties have
traveled out of their home state for the express purpose of evading that
state's prohibition of their marriage and returned home immediately
after being married," have the least likelihood of recognition.128 Strong
public policy in the couple's home state, such as a DOMA, could
invalidate the marriage in the home state.129 But at least one Attorney
General, in a state with a constitution explicitly defining marriage as
122. 579 N.W.2d 431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Id. at 435 ("The prosecutor argues that extending spousal privileges to common-law
marriages is against the public policy of Michigan. This is a question properly left to the
Legislature. Presumably, the Legislature could refuse to recognize common-law marriages if it
chose to do so, as it has done with same-sex marriages in M.C.L. § 551.271(2); M.S.A. §
25.15(2) and M.C.L. § 551.272; M.S.A. § 25.16.").
124. See, e.g., supra note 121.
125. But see infra text accompanying notes 127-35 (discussing circumstances under
which even a state with a DOMA should recognize a same-sex marriage). Wyoming has a pre-
DOMA statute limiting marriage to different-sex couples. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101
(2010). But the state also recognizes the validity of any marriage that is valid in the state
where it was contracted. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111 (2010). The Wyoming Supreme Court
recently held that the latter law gave district courts in Wyoming jurisdiction to grant a divorce
to same-sex couples. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 155 (Wyo. 2011).
126. Koppelman, supra note 98; Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex
Marriage Recognition, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2028, 2038-43 (2003).
127. Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2145.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Lane v. Albanese, No. FA0440021288, 2005 WL 896129, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2005) (noting, in a case prior to approval of same-sex marriage in Connecticut, that
Connecticut residents' same-sex marriage contracted in Massachusetts was null and void, and
therefore did not give rise to Connecticut jurisdiction for divorce); Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d
47, 48-49 (Ga. App. 2002) (Georgia domiciliaries' same-sex Vermont civil union is not
marriage and even if it were a marriage instead of a civil union, Georgia would not recognize
it).
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between a man and a woman, has issued an advisory opinion
recommending that the state recognize out-of-state same-sex
marriages.130 Unless their marriages are recognized, however, same-
sex couples in evasive marriages are unlikely to assert the marital
evidentiary privileges successfully.
When same-sex couples live and marry in one state and then
move out of that state, they have "migratory marriage[s]."l 3 1 These
marriages will still be valid if the new home state recognizes same-sex
marriages or has not enacted a DOMA or constitutional ban on same-
sex marriages. 13 2 If the new state recognizes marriage-like unions
other than marriage, then a same-sex couple likely may assert any
privilege provided for under the recognized unions, even if the
couple's union is not recognized as a marriage.133 Even a state DOMA
need not invalidate rights that could have been contracted for
independent of marriage but would invalidate rights, such as
evidentiary privileges, that only exist as a result of marriage.134
Same-sex spouses are most likely to be able to invoke marital
evidentiary privileges in extraterritorial and visitor marriages.' 35 When
same-sex spouses never leave the state in which they legally married
but find themselves enmeshed in out-of-state litigation, they have an
extraterritorial marriage.136 Cases involving former anti-miscegenation
laws provide precedent for recognizing extraterritorial marriages by
holding that the laws voiding interracial marriages only affect
interracial couples cohabiting within the state.137
"Visitor marriages" are those in which same-sex spouses are
"temporarily present in a state that does not recognize their
marriages." 38 Not even a state DOMA should ban recognition of these
marriages because "[a]ny other result is inconsistent with the
constitutional right of citizens to travel." 39 In the 1879 case Ex parte
Kinney, the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia refused to recognize the Washington, D.C. marriage of an
130. 95 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 3, supra note 7 at 54.
131. Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2145.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id; see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 136-142.
136. Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2145.
137. Id. at 2146, 2162-63 (citing Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948)).
138. Id. at 2145.
139. Id But see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (showing that DOMA legally
may establish such a ban).
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interracial Virginia couple. 140 The federal court upheld the state court's
finding that Kinney, as a Virginia domiciliary, was guilty of
miscegenation and related crimes, but also noted:
Virginia could not enforce its law against
nondomiciliaries nor exclude altogether interracial
couples domiciled in the District of Columbia. "That
such a citizen would have a right of transit with his wife
through Virginia, and of temporary stoppage, and of
carrying on any business here not requiring residence,
may be conceded, because these are privileges
following a citizen of the United States . . . ." The
reference to "temporary stoppage" clearly implies that
Virginia might have to tolerate within its borders sexual
intercourse between a black man and a white woman.141
Thus, a married, same-sex couple residing in a state that
recognizes same-sex marriages should be able to invoke marital
evidentiary privileges when they litigate in or temporarily visit a state
that does not recognize same-sex marriages. 14 2
IV. AVAILABILITY OF STATE MARITAL PRIVILEGES TO SAME-SEX
COUPLES IN CIVIL UNIONS OR DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
Same-sex couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships
face many of the same challenges that same-sex spouses face when
trying to assert the marital privileges that are incidental to their unions
in their home states. 143 Where applicable state laws explicitly
recognize same-sex unions, same-sex couples are more likely to
succeed in asserting marital privileges.144 Where applicable state laws
explicitly recognize same-sex marriages, but not marriage-like unions,
same-sex couples in marriage-like unions still should be able to assert
marital privileges successfully.1 45 In contrast, where applicable state
140. 14 F. Cas. 602, 608 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 7825).
141. Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2161-62 (quoting Kinney, 14 F. Cas. at 606).
142. See generally supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing case that addressed
interracial marriage as today's courts might address same-sex marriage).
143. See supra Part III for a discussion of the challenges as they pertain to same-sex
spouses.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 155-60.
145. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding "that none of the interests
asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just basis for the continued exclusion of same-
sex couples from the benefits incident to a civil marriage license," and that there is a
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laws explicitly do not recognize same-sex marriages or unions, same-
sex couples in marriage-like unions are unlikely to succeed when
asserting marital privileges.14 6 They face a greater challenge than do
same-sex spouses because their unions, despite their equivalence to
marriages, are not marriages.147 Nonetheless, because these unions are
supposed to be equivalent to marriages, courts should extend the same
evidentiary privileges to same-sex couples in civil unions and
partnerships as to married same-sex couples. 148
Even if some states are reluctant to extend marital privileges to
same-sex couples that are not married, partners in same-sex unions or
partnerships may assert the marital privileges successfully in some
forums. 149 For example, in the state where the partner entered into the
civil union or domestic partnership, the partner may assert the
privileges because these unions grant all of the rights inherent in
- 150 - -
marriage. Similarly, in any other state granting civil unions or
partnerships' 5 1 and perhaps in states granting same-sex marriages, the
partner should be able to assert the evidentiary privileges because
states will recognize each other's unions and these unions include
evidentiary spousal privileges. 152 Consider, for example, Hennefeld v.
Twp. of Montclair, which the New Jersey Tax Court heard when New
Jersey offered limited domestic partnerships for same-sex couples but
did not offer civil unions.153 The court held that it would recognize a
Vermont civil union under the state's Domestic Partnership Act, but it
would not afford the Vermont union more rights than granted under
the New Jersey Act.154
But some states have DOMAs or constitutional provisions
explicitly banning the recognition of any marriage-like union of same-
sex partners, and these laws prevent partners in same-sex unions or
partnerships from asserting the evidentiary marital privileges in those
"constitutional obligation to extend to . . . [same sex-couples] the . . . protection . . . that
Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples.").
146. See infra text accompanying notes 155-60.
147. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
149. See infra Table 1.
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. Some other State laws, such as HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (1997) and ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, § 2710 (2009), offer domestic partnerships with more limited rights; this article
does not consider these unions because they are not equated with marriage.
152. See infra Table 1.
153. 22 N.J. Tax 166, 187 (2005).
154. Id. at 185-87.
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states. 155 There, the marital privileges are not available to any same-
sex partner, regardless of the label on the individual's relationship.156
Where state DOMAs only ban recognition of same-sex
marriages, a party or witness could argue that the court should
recognize a "union" or "partnership." 5  However, the argument may
fail for several reasons. First, courts may find that the policy against
same-sex marriage supports the denial of marital rights to same-sex
partners, no matter how the relationship is labeled.158 Second, to avoid
the DOMA's prohibitions, a party would have to distinguish the union
from a marriage. 159 The courts construe the evidentiary privileges
strictly, and the "spousal" privileges cannot exist outside marriage.'60
Consequently, if parties or witnesses argue that they are not married,
courts are less likely to recognize their right to assert spousal
privileges.
In states without civil unions, domestic partnerships, or
DOMAs, courts deciding whether to permit the invocation of
evidentiary privileges should regard civil unions and partnerships as
marriages. Courts have stressed "marital harmony" 62  and
considered the marital privileges "so essential to the preservation of
the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of the justice which the privilege entails."l 63 Civil
unions and domestic partnerships also would benefit from the
privileges' protection and would suffer from the same strife caused
155. See infra Table 1.
156. See supra Part II.C.
157. See Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2147-48 ("[T]he recent wave of legislation
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages is of doubtful relevance here, since most of those
statutes specifically refuse recognition only to same-sex marriages. Opposition to legal
recognition of same-sex relationships is far weaker than opposition to giving those
relationships the label of marriage."). Koppelman noted, however, that some believe that the
tendency to recognize out-of-state marriages diminishes when the relationship is not called a
"marriage." Id. at 2147.
158. Id. at 2149-50.
159. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
160. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144 (2003); see supra Part III.B.1.
161. This proposal runs contrary to the strict construction of evidentiary privileges. See
supra Part II.A. See also Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 482 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005) (Fisher, J., dissenting) (stating that where a wrongful death statute, requiring
the same narrow construction as evidentiary privileges, recognized spouses, not partners, and
the use of spouse left "no doubt that it was intended to include only those persons joined
together in marriage.") See also infra Part VI (provides an argument for the court that does not
accept this proposal).
162. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
163. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
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when one spouse is forced to testify against the other.164 There may be
no national public policy in favor of preserving same-sex unions, but
when the public policy reasons for preserving marriages also apply to
same-sex unions, the spousal privileges should be available equally in
both. 165
To determine which same-sex unions, in which forums, merit
the protection of the privileges under public policy, the courts should
consider the couple's ties to the state in which the union was formed
and the public policies of the states involved in the litigation. 166 An
evasive union, such as where a couple from Idaho enters into a civil
union in Nevada or Oregon, lacks public policy support in any forum,
because the couple's home state, which has a DOMA, does not
recognize the union. 167 Similarly, in a migratory union where the
couple moved to a state with a DOMA, the couple's new home state
-168
may not recognize the union.
In contrast, extraterritorial and visitor unions have strong
policy support in forums without DOMAs for two reasons: the couples
reside in states where the public policy favoring equal rights provided
for a union with rights equivalent to marriage, and states without
DOMAs have a weaker public policy argument against recognizing the
union.o7 0 In these circumstances, the same-sex relationships have little
impact on the forum state because the couples do not reside or
regularly assert rights in the forum state; the home state's public policy
should govern.'71
V. FEDERAL MARITAL PRIVILEGES AVAILABLE TO SAME-SEX
COUPLES
In federal court, the federal common-law privileges generally
are available to same-sex couples.17 2 Although the Federal DOMA
164. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (N.J. 2006).
165. Id. at 200.
166. See Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2145-46 (describing four categories).
167. See id. (couples' intent to circumvent laws not supported by public policy behind
laws).
168. See id. (statutory ban creates clear public policy against recognition).
169. See infra Table 1.
170. Koppelman, supra note 98, at 2145.
171. Id.
172. FED. R. EvrD. 501; see also LYNN McLAIN, 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE-STATE AND
FEDERAL § 501:4(b) (2001) ("State privileges do not apply in federal criminal cases."). One
exception is that state privileges apply in cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. See id. § 501:4 n.1 ("'The arguments advanced in favor of recognizing state
privileges are: a state privilege is an essential characteristic of a relationship or status created
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narrowly defines marriage as between a man and a woman, the statute
does not affect the federal evidentiary privileges, federal court
proceedings, or the state laws that federal courts use to determine the
validity of a marriage.173 Moreover, the Federal DOMA pertains only
to "any Act of Congress, or . .. any ruling, regulation, or interpretation
of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States,,1 74 It does not pertain to court-created common law, 175 the
source of the federal privileges.176 Therefore, the Federal DOMA does
not affect the federal marital evidentiary privileges and does not limit
their use to opposite-sex spouses. 177 Same-sex couples may have
greater success at asserting marital privileges in federal court.' 78
The Federal DOMA also does not define "marriage" for the
purposes of state law, and the determination of a marriage's validity is
a matter of state law.179 The federal DOMA defines "marriage" and
"spouse" for any use the words might have in federal legislation and
documents.1so Because marriage is a matter of state law, a federal
court cannot use the Federal DOMA to invalidate a marriage for
evidentiary purposes. Moreover, the Obama administration has
announced that it believes that the Federal DOMA is unconstitutional
by state law and thus is substantive in the Erie sense; state policy ought not to be frustrated by
the accident of diversity; the allowance or denial of a privilege is so likely to affect the
outcome of litigation as to encourage forum selection on that basis, not a proper function of
diversity jurisdiction."') (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 2391 (1974) (statements of Rep. Holtzman
and Rep. Dennis)); Id. § 501:4(b)(iii).
173. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); see also infra note 179 and accompanying text.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. FED. R. EvID. 501.
177. See supra Part III.B. 1.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
179. United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The status of
marriage has been left to the states.); Gill v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D.
Mass. 2010) ("There can be no dispute that the subject of domestic relations is the exclusive
province of the states. And the powers to establish eligibility requirements for marriage, as
well as to issue determinations of martial [sic] status, lie at the very core of such domestic
relations law. . . . Congress does not have the authority to place restrictions on the states'
power to issue marriage licenses. And indeed ... DOMA refrains from directly doing so. . . .
Congress has [no] interest in a uniform definition of marriage for purposes of determining
federal rights, benefits, and privileges.") (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 12 (2004)) (other internal citations omitted); see supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
180. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
181. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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and that it will not defend the Federal DOMA.18 2 Indeed, federal
courts have held that the federal DOMA violates "equal protection
rights afforded under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, either under heightened scrutiny or under rational basis
review."183
In any event, federal courts are not considered in the Federal
DOMA.184  The Act grants only "[s]tate[s], territor[ies], or
possession[s] of the United States, or Indian tribe[s]" the right not to
recognize marriage-like unions of people of the same sex.' 85
Therefore, the second section of the Federal DOMA, under which such
legal bodies "shall [not] be required to give effect to" a same-sex
marriage, does not apply to the federal courts.186 Unless a federal court
applies a state law that invalidates the marriage, the court should
recognize same-sex marriages for the purpose of determining the
availability of the marital evidentiary privileges.' 8 7
Although the privileges typically are available only to
"spouses," and the courts favor strict construction, the courts have
stressed that marriage is a matter of state law. 188 Where the state law
provides same-sex couples with equal rights to married couples, the
rights incidental to same-sex unions should also be a matter of state
law. Because federal courts must recognize marriages that are granted
under state laws, the courts also should recognize the same-sex
relationships that state laws treat as marriages by imbuing them with
equal rights. Therefore, the federal evidentiary privileges should be
available to same-sex couples in civil unions or domestic partnerships
that afford the couples equivalent rights to marriage.
182. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 11/February/I 1 -ag-222.html.
183. In re Balas, 449 BR. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Levenson (Levenson
Jl), 587 F.3d 925, 931-33 (9th Cir. 2009); Dragovich v. United States Dep't of the Treasury,
764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976).
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VI. CHALLENGING EVIDENTIARY RULES WITH AN EQUAL
PROTECTION ARGUMENT WHEN MARITAL PRIVILEGES ARE NOT
AVAILABLE
If a trial court does not find that a same-sex spouse or partner is
a "spouse" under the applicable rules of evidentiary privilege and the
testimony materially affects the outcome of the case, the same-sex
spouse or partner should make an equal protection argument on
appeal.189 The structure of the appellate argument would depend on the
applicable statutory language.190 If an evidentiary privilege
distinguishes between "spouse" and "partner," the court should apply a
rational basis test and uphold the constitutionality of the privilege only
if the distinction bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
government purpose.191 If the evidentiary privilege distinguishes
between "spouse" and "same-sex spouse," the court should adopt one
of two approaches: apply strict scrutiny and uphold the
constitutionality of the privilege only if the distinction serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to that
interest, or apply heightened scrutiny and uphold the privilege only if
the classification serves an important government objective and the
classification is substantially related to achieving that objective.' 92 The
likelihood of success of an equal protection argument therefore will
189. See Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (where plaintiff made equal protection claim after not being found a "spouse").
190. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
191. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996) (applying rational basis test to
Equal Protection issue concerning homosexuals). Same-sex partners could argue that strict
scrutiny should apply because the issue concerns the implied fundamental right of marriage.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978). As to same-sex partners whom the laws
distinguish from spouses, however, the real issue is not the right to marriage, but rather the
fact that the partners simply do not have a marriage. The distinction between same-sex
partners and opposite-sex spouses is a classification of homosexuals or others who choose to
couple with members of their own gender; neither classification rises to the level of strict or
even heightened scrutiny. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. Alternatively, same-sex partners could
argue that heightened scrutiny should apply because the issue concerns the gender of the
same-sex partners. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). This argument is
unlikely to succeed because the classification of "partners" still does not concern their gender.
192. Same-sex spouses also could argue that strict scrutiny should apply because the
issue concerns the implied fundamental right of marriage. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87. The
argument might succeed as to same-sex spouses because their right to marry involves
recognition of the marriage and its privileges. Not all matters concerning marriage merit strict
scrutiny. Id. "To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." Id. Same-sex
spouses also could argue, with a greater likelihood of success than same-sex partners, that
heightened scrutiny should apply because the issue concerns the gender of the same-sex
spouses. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 135. Cf In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143-44 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
2004) (applying rational basis test to constitutional analysis of DOMA).
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depend on whether the state has a DOMA or other public policy and
whether the same-sex couple is married or in a partnership. 93 Similar
arguments apply under a rational basis test and under strict and
heightened scrutiny. 194
Where a state does not recognize any same-sex unions and has
a DOMA stating its public policy against recognition of same-sex
marriage, to the extent that DOMAs have withstood constitutional
challenges, the state's limitation of the marital privileqes to opposite-
sex couples is likely to withstand a rational basis test. 95 The purpose
of making an evidentiary privilege only available to opposite-sex
couples is to limit the incidental benefits of marriage to opposite-sex
spouses.196 This is consistent with the legitimate government purpose
of the DOMAs: to limit marriage to opposite-sex spouses.' 97 There is a
rational relation between that purpose and the distinction between
spouses and partners because the distinction preserves the DOMA's
protection of marriage; marital rights likely will be granted only to
those who are party to an opposite-sex marriage.198
Even if the court applies heightened or strict scrutiny, the
classification still may be valid if the court deems that limiting
marriages to opposite-sex spouses is an important or compelling
government interest. 199 Under either of the higher-level scrutiny tests,
the appellate court may conclude that the distinction between "spouse"
and "same-sex spouse" is substantially related and narrowly tailored to
the government's interest; it excludes same-sex spouses, and only
same-sex spouses, from a privilege that is only available to opposite-
sex spouses.200
Where the state does not have a DOMA, a same-sex spouse or
partner still will have to prove a lack of a legitimate government
purpose behind an evidentiary privilege that distinguishes between
partners and spouses, or perhaps, the lack of an important or
compelling government interest behind an evidentiary privilege that
193. See infra text accompanying notes 195-223.
194. Id.
195. See generally Kandu, 315 B.R. at 148 (federal DOMA not unconstitutional under
rational basis test).
196. See supra note 55.
197. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
198. U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
199. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 666 (Md. 2007) (citing Opinion of the
Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1997) for an example of a state
law which required an application of strict scrutiny to assess the governmental classification
based solely on sex.).
200. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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distinguishes between spouses and same-sex spouses.201 The proof will
be easiest in states that offer same-sex unions or partnerships because
those states' governments offer same-sex partners in legal unions the
same rights as spouses.202 New Jersey, for example, could not
constitutionally limit its evidentiary privileges to different-sex
spouses.203 Indeed, its civil union law explicitly states that the
* - 204
evidentiary privileges apply to same-sex partners in legal unions.
Even California, which has a state DOMA, would have to construe its
evidentiary privileges to include same-sex spouses and partners from
other states because it could not rationally prevent a same-sex spouse
or partner from asserting a privilege when such privileges are available
to same-sex partners within the state. 205  Same-sex couples in
jurisdictions that grant same-sex marriages similarly could prove the
lack of a rational basis for distinguishing spouses from partners
because those states allow same-sex marriages, and legal partnerships
provide the very same privileges.206
Without a compelling or even legitimate government purpose,
it is not necessary to determine if a privilege law distinguishing
between spouses and same-sex spouses is narrowly tailored or
rationally related to a government interest, the law already fails to pass
constitutional muster. 7 Thus, applying either the rational basis test or
strict scrutiny in states offering same-sex unions, same-sex spouses
and partners in legal unions should be able to assert spousal
208privileges.
Similar equal protection analyses would apply in New Mexico,
where the legislature has not enacted a DOMA or recognized
201. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 52, 54 and accompanying text.
203. See Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166, 183-84 (2005) (even though
Canadian marriage not recognized as marriage, privileges available to couples in civil union
allowed).
204. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West 2009).
205. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004); CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (2007) (anti-
marital facts); id. § 980 (confidential communications). California presents a unique
circumstance because the state makes domestic partnerships available not only to same-sex
couples but also to opposite-sex couples with one person over the age of 62. Compare CAL.
FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5)(B) (West 2004) (domestic partners may be of opposite-sex under
certain conditions) with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38bb(2) (2006) (civil union available to
same-sex couples only); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West 2007) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1202(2) (2002) (same). Therefore, preventing same-sex couples from asserting the
marital privileges does not preserve traditional marriages because the privileges are available
to unmarried, opposite-sex couples in domestic partnerships.
206. See infra notes 201-05, 208 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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marriage-like unions for same-sex couples explicitly. 209 The difference
is that while there is less proof that the state has a clear olicy against
same-sex unions than there is in states with a DOMA, there is also
less proof that the state has no such policy than there is in states where
marriage-like unions are expressly permitted. 2 11 Notably, allowing a
same-sex spouse to assert a privilege would not countermand the
narrow construction of the evidentiary privileges.212 But in New
Mexico, the evidentiary privilege refers to "husband" and "wife," so
same-sex spouses may not qualify. 2 13 If a marital privilege uses
"spouse" rather than "husband" or "wife", same-sex couples fit the
language of the privilege without need for interpretation, and it is
therefore more likely that the couple can prove that the government
lacks a compelling or even legitimate reason for denying the couple's
right to assert the privilege.
In an equal protection challenge to a marital evidentiary
privilege, same-sex spouses have a greater likelihood of success than
same-sex partners, not only because the privilege must withstand strict
scrutiny, but also because they are "spouses." 214 For example, in
Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N. Y., which was decided before New
York legalized same-sex marriage, a plaintiff who entered into a civil
union in Vermont, where a civil union "is sanctioned and affords all
benefits and obligations of marriage under the laws of Vermont,"
asked a New York trial court to recognize him as a spouse under New
215York's wrongful death statute.21 The intermediate appellate court held
that the plaintiff did not qualify as a spouse under the statute, 216 but it
noted that the holding may have been different if the plaintiff had
209. See infra Table 1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (2009).
210. See Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(noting, prior to New York's recognition of same-sex marriages, that New York did not have a
DOMA and concluding that, until the state legislature "decide[s] to prohibit the recognition of
same- sex marriages solemnized abroad[,] . . . . such marriages are entitled to recognition in
New York").
211. See supra Parts II.A & C, Part III.B.1.
212. See supra Part II.A. (regarding narrow construction of evidentiary privileges).
213. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6(A) (2007) ("No husband shall be compelled to disclose
any communication made by his wife during the marriage, and no wife shall be compelled to
disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the marriage.").
214. See infra text accompanying notes 215-23.
215. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
216. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).
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married in Massachusetts such that he was a spouse, albeit a same-sex
spouse.217
Langan illustrates how a court might address the availability of
the evidentiary privileges to someone who is a partner, rather than a
spouse, in states without DOMAs or same-sex unions. 218 The majority
held that a wrongful death statute's exclusion of same-sex partners was
constitutional under a rational basis test, 219 while the dissent reached
the opposite conclusion using the same test.220 The court held that the
exclusion had a rational relationship to a legitimate government
purpose because "it has already been established that confining
marriage and all laws pertaining either directly or indirectly to the
marital relationship to different sex couples is not offensive to the
equal protection clause of either the Federal or State constitutions." 22 1
The dissent considered two United States Supreme Court cases
holding that no rational relationship existed "between any
governmental purpose promoted by a wrongful death law and a
classification of wrongful death plaintiffs or victims according to their
legitimacy." 222 Applying the United States Supreme Court's analyses
of wrongful death statutes, the dissent held that the classification of
wrongful death plaintiffs according to their sexual orientation bore no
rational relationship to New York's purpose of "fostering and
promoting traditional marriage." 223 That purpose probably would
support excluding partners from the protections of the evidentiary
privileges, because the privileges protect marital relationships, and
protecting same-sex marriages contravenes that purpose. 22 Thus,
where a same-sex couple cannot show that the government has no
purpose, even absent a DOMA, the privileges are likely to withstand a
constitutional challenge, whereas the privileges are likely to be held
unconstitutional where a state lacks such a purpose.225
217. Id. at 479. The plaintiffs partner died before same-sex marriage became possible in
Massachusetts.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 219-223.
219. Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
220. Id. at 480 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 478 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), for the
proposition that "the denial of marital status to same-sex couples did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution" and noting that later United States Supreme
Court cases did not overrule that holding).
222. Id at 489-90 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)).
223. Id at 490.
224. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
225. See generally supra Part 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Courts apply a two-tiered analysis to see whether a witness or
party may assert a spousal privilege. They consider the availability
of the privilege in the forum and whether the person seeking it may
assert the privilege.227 It is crucial to determine whether the laws of the
person's domiciliary state classify the person as a spouse or as a
person with the rights of a spouse. 28 States have recognized marriages
that would not otherwise be valid in their states, such as common-law,
and historically, interracial marriages,229 and states can recognize the
validity of same-sex marriages. 230
Same-sex spouses have strong arguments in favor of asserting
spousal privileges in federal courts and in state courts when the
- - 231
spouses are domiciled in states that recognize same-sex marriages.
Same-sex couples in legal unions and partnerships should be able to
232
assert the privileges to the same extent as opposite-sex spouses.
Applying the rational basis test in states offering same-sex unions and
states without DOMAs, same-sex spouses and partners in legal unions
should be able to assert spousal privileges or have the privileges struck
down as unconstitutional.233 The limited availability of the privileges
in most forums should not limit the availability of the privileges where
public policy supports their availability to same-sex spouses and
partners.234 Although same-sex spouses and partners are not treated
uniformly across jurisdictions, in the circumstances discussed above,
they should be able to avail themselves of the evidentiary privileges
enjoyed by different-sex spouses.
226. See discussion supra Part III.
227. See discussion supra Part III.
228. See discussion supra Part III.B.
229. See discussion supra Part IIIB. 1.
230. See discussion supra Part III.
231. See discussion supra Parts III.B.2, V.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.
233. See discussion supra Part VI.
234. See discussion supra Part III.B.2, IV.
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